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Hao discloses 3-year spy plan
Xin Li, The Epoch Times

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A Special Agent's Confession
TOKYO - Hao Fengjun, a former special agent for China's Public Security Bureau who is currently applying for political asylum in Australia, disclosed in the Channel 9 special "Behind Chinese Walls", that Japan contains a high concentration of undercover Chinese agents from the 6-10 Office. Along with the US, Canada, and Australia it is the focus of a concentrated spy network aimed directly at monitoring the Falun Gong meditation group.

Hao, 32 years old, recently gave a telephone interview with The Epoch Times in Japan. He discussed the 6-26-3 Plan, which was drafted by the CCP and is a detailed account of the CCP's intention to monitor the actions of overseas Falun Gong practitioners.

Too Many Agents

When asked whether he would apply for asylum in Japan if turned down in Australia, Hao replied that there are too many secret agents in Japan; that it would not be safe for him there. Again referencing the 6-26-3 Plan, Hao said, " Japan, along with North America, Australia and some other countries, has been targeted for intense monitoring of Falun Gong activity, especially in the coastal cities."

Though only directly active in Australia, as a secret agent Hao was privy to a great deal of information from other regions in the spy network, including Japan.

A Comprehensive Monitoring Strategy

According to Hao, at the June 26, 2002 meeting of China's Ministry of Public Security in Taijin, the decision was made to shift the focus of the CCP's extensive overseas spy network to monitoring of Falun Gong practitioners. A comprehensive plan was drawn up that required its operatives in all major cities around the globe to have a complete monitoring system in place within the next three years. The plan came to be referred to as the "6-26-3 Plan."
All operatives were required to compile a detailed profile on each Falun Gong practitioner, including an exhaustive list of personal contacts in Mainland China. Anyone associated with Falun Gong was targeted regardless of their actual level of involvement or whether they had ever appealed to the CCP to end its persecution of Falun Gong.

Hao cited the case of some Japanese practitioners as an example: They were followed and detained by the local Public Security Bureau upon entering China to visit their families. By the time the practitioners had actually touched down in China, the local Public Security Bureau had already received extensive intelligence on each individual, all of which had been collected by CCP agents in Japan.

The information is then passed on to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and among other things, is used to create a "black list" to be distributed to all of the consulates.
The airport customs officers are notified via computer link of the inbound travelers, who are detained and then given over to the Public Security (read 6-10) officers. Once in the hands of the 6-10 Office these practitioners face intimidation and torture.

Hao says that there is written protocol for the spy activities, and they are carried out as detailed in the 6-26-3 Plan from city to city. Each area organizes itself in adherence to this plan. The secret agents to Japan and other countries are sent as businessmen, with fake companies.
Many of the agents carrying out this dirty work masquerade as business people, as this gives them maximum status and mobility within foreign countries.

Many Are Just Waiting to Defect

Hao knows for a fact that there are many others like him within the ranks of the 6-10 Office who are simply waiting for their chance to defect. He firmly believes that many of them will see his example and find the courage do so.
He stressed that he is but one of many of his peers who share the same thoughts, and that the others are waiting for the right chance to present itself, at which time they will surely defect.

Hao reminded us that there is a defection hotline in the U.S.: 1-818-309-4529, which anyone considering defecting can call for advice and assistance. The key seems to be making more Chinese aware that such support exists, that they are not alone.

He pointed out that due to Internet blockades, an estimated 90 percent of Chinese people have not even heard of the mass resignation from the CCP. Most cannot access the resignation sites set-up and maintained by The Epoch Times. The only reason that he became aware of the movement was that he had security clearance and could access such Internet sites.
Hao encourages people to redouble the efforts to get information about the resignation to the Chinese people. He acknowledges the danger faced by any mainland Chinese who posts a resignation statement using his or her real name; they will surely be detained and sent to the labor camps for "re-education." In spite of the danger he encourages people to continue, and calls on overseas supporters to step up the efforts to break the information blockade in China.

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